时 间：2023年10月25日（周三） 11:30 -15:00
地 点：理科大楼A1716会议室
题 目：2023yl6809永利微观经济学暨‘灵活就业招工 平台行为干预与机制设计’讲座之五
报告人：陈栗 副教授
主持人：龚冰琳 研究员
摘 要：
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. The top trading cycle algorithm (TTC) respects preferences but may violate priorities. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient and there is a unique allocation that respects priorities. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. We discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings. We show through simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient.
报告人简介：
Li Chen, senior lecturer at Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
Her research interests are matching market and the design of marketplace, combining theoretical, empirical, and experimental analysis. Her current research includes topics on school choice allocation, civil servants assignment, and public housing allocation.
